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Summary
False memories may be especially likely when one is exposed to misinformation that
is consistent with one's beliefs. Here, we assessed whether feminist attitudes predict
susceptibility to feminism-related fake news. In Experiment 1 (n = 1537), the more
negative participants' attitudes towards feminism, the more likely they were to report
a false memory for a fabricated event that negatively reflected on the feminist move-
ment, and vice-versa. This effect was only evident for those who interpreted the
event as expected (e.g., those who rated the event as bad for feminism). When the
purpose of the study was revealed, feminist attitudes also predicted ability to identify
the stories as fake. We replicated these findings in Experiment 2 (n = 786), using fake
stories that were less ambiguous. This study suggests that individuals are more sus-
ceptible to false memories for fake news stories that are ideologically congruent,
even after a warning.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
There is some debate as to whether social media encourages us to live
our online lives in “ideological echo chambers” or “bubbles” and dis-
torts our perceptions of the world (Eady et al., 2019). However, if we
did all see the same news, would we be likely to form different memo-
ries of the past? Decades of research have demonstrated the ease
with which individuals can form rich false memories and beliefs for
events that never happened (Loftus, 2005), often in response to fake
news stories (Greene & Murphy, 2020) and that these memories can
be biased in line with our political opinions (Murphy et al., 2019). The
current study assessed false memories and beliefs for feminism-
related events that never occurred, examining whether susceptibility
to these fake news stories differs according to existing attitudes
towards feminism.
The biasing effect of political opinions can be understood within
a number of memory models. The Source Monitoring Framework
(Johnson et al., 1993) explains that our memories are not stored with
individual files with tags that identify their source, we must infer the
source of information based on the available information. So, for
example, when establishing whether we witnessed a conversation
between two people or we heard about it second-hand, we engage in
two forms of judgement; heuristic (the amount of perceptual informa-
tion available, or how closely it matches with a schema or template –
“Does that sound like X's voice?”) and systematic (retrieval of
supporting memories, reasoning about inconsistencies between the
memory and what is otherwise known – “Does this conversation fit
with what I know about the relationship I have with X?”). Source moni-
toring is generally very effective and we are typically successful at dis-
tinguishing the source of information. However, false memories are
likely to occur when these source monitoring judgements are dis-
torted, for example when the fabricated event appears more percep-
tually detailed through the use of doctored photos or encouraged
imagination (Henkel, 2011; Sacchi et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2003;
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Wade et al., 2002) or when the fabricated event is in line with our cur-
rent opinions or beliefs (Montgomery & Rajagopal, 2018). Political bias
then could be one manner in which source monitoring errors may be
increased, as political opinions may weight expectations in a particular
direction. Evidence suggests that when an individual has insufficient
information to determine the source of a memory, they are likely to
guess based on prior knowledge (Bayen et al., 2000), using stereo-
types and schemata to determine the most likely source (Spaniol &
Bayen, 2002). This results in a greater likelihood of stereotype-
consistent false memories (Kleider, Goldinger, & Knuycky, 2008;
Kleider, Pezdek, et al., 2008). Individuals may also engage in “content
borrowing”, where experiential details are imported from true memo-
ries and can increase confidence that the false memory is a true recol-
lection (Lampinen et al., 2005; Lyle & Johnson, 2006). Thus there are
a number of ways that political bias may affect how individuals recon-
struct events, as well as affecting their confidence in these memories.
A number of applied studies have found evidence to support this
biasing effect in the context of politics, demonstrating the importance
of the match between one's own beliefs and a fabricated news story.
Conservatives were found to be more likely to report a false memory
for a fabricated scandal involving President Obama than were liberals,
and liberals were more likely to report a false memory for a fabricated
scandal involving President Bush than were conservatives (Frenda
et al., 2013). This “congruency effect” - where alignment of prior
beliefs with a fake story increases false memory susceptibility - was
recently demonstrated during a real-world abortion referendum
(Murphy et al., 2019). Yes and No voters were presented with fabri-
cated news stories 1 week before the referendum and the findings
indicated that Yes voters were more susceptible to false memories
and beliefs for fabricated No scandals, and No voters were more sus-
ceptible to false memories and beliefs for fabricated Yes scandals.
When informed about the purpose of the study, Yes voters were less
likely to correctly identify fabricated No scandals as fake, and No
voters were less likely to correctly identify fabricated Yes scandals as
fake. These studies suggest that existing attitudes can affect suscepti-
bility to false memories and impact the ability to detect fake news
even when alerted to it.
Though many political decisions are necessarily binary (Clinton
vs. Trump, Yes vs. No, Leave vs. Remain, etc.), political opinions are
often more complex. For instance, a voter could be slightly leaning
towards a candidate, or an ardent supporter who is deeply involved in
the campaign. To date, the studies that have demonstrated an effect
of ideological congruency on false memories have only examined this
effect along a binary (Yes vs. No voters, Liberals vs. Conservatives)
and so it is not clear if this effect would be moderated by strength of
support. Though there is evidence that Yes supporters would be more
susceptible than No supporters to false memories or beliefs for a No
campaign scandal, it is not clear whether a deeply-committed Yes sup-
porter would be more susceptible than a wavering Yes supporter.
Such a continuum would make sense, as those who feel stronger
about an issue may experience a greater biasing effect when making a
judgement about the source of the memory.
A further issue is the interpretation of news stories. Political
events can be complicated and interpretation can vary between
individuals (Claassen & Ensley, 2016). In previous work (Murphy
et al., 2019), qualitative data indicated that though the scandals were
mostly perceived as intended (i.e., as negative for the side mentioned),
there were some participants who reported a neutral or apathetic
response to the story, and even a minority who said that the story
actually reflected well on the side mentioned. It is not clear whether
interpretation of the story as intended is essential to observe the con-
gruency effect. This is important for understanding the mechanisms
behind the congruency effect. For example, are conservatives more
likely to remember a fabricated scandal involving President Obama
because it aligns with their views (i.e., it reflects negatively on a Dem-
ocratic president), or because it is familiar to them in some other way
(i.e., similar to other stories they may have heard before, or more
familiar due to differences in media consumption, etc.)? If subjective
interpretation plays a role in susceptibility to false memories and
beliefs, this may have implications for the design and targeting of
interventions to combat misinformation. Individuals may be most sus-
ceptible to stories they interpret to reflect well on their preferred
political side or reflect poorly on the opposition, as distinct from
whether a third-party might view the story as objectively positive or
negative for either side.
A contemporary political issue where opinions and perceptions of
news stories can differ widely is feminism (Lanius, 2019; PettyJohn
et al., 2019). We hypothesised that opinions about feminism would
predict susceptibility to fabricated stories about feminism, with those
who support feminism being more susceptible to stories that reflect
well on feminism and those who do not support feminism being more
susceptible to stories that reflect poorly on feminism.
2 | EXPERIMENT 1
This study was conducted in early 2019, in the wake of the #MeToo
movement, which was a form of “hashtag activism” intended to dem-
onstrate how widespread sexual abuse is in the lives of women and
girls (Kangere et al., 2017). We examined three research questions:
1. Do attitudes towards feminism differentially predict false memo-
ries and beliefs for stories that reflect positively/negatively on
feminism?
2. Do attitudes towards feminism predict ability to identify fake
feminism-related news stories as fabricated?




We recruited for this study via student email lists and social media
posts and targeted as many responses as possible before an agreed
stopping date. The study was completed by 1537 participants with a
mean age of 26.05 years (SD = 9.22). There were no exclusion
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criteria, beyond being over 18 years old. Participants were mostly
(60%) women (n = 920), with 565 men, 25 who reported their gender
as other, and 27 who preferred not to say. Most participants (86%)
were Irish nationals, and the remaining participants were from another
EU country (9%) or outside of the EU (5%). When asked if they identi-
fied as a feminist, 58% agreed or strongly agreed, 21% disagreed or
strongly disagreed, and 21% neither agreed nor disagreed. 87% of the
sample said they used social media a few times a day or more, over the
past year. Participants reported interest in the #MeToo movement, with
75% saying they were somewhat likely, likely or very likely to read an
online article about the #MeToo movement if they came across it.
2.1.2 | Materials
Feminism Attitudes. A scale to measure support for the feminist move-
ment was developed for this study. Participants were asked to rate their
agreement with five statements on a scale of (1) Strongly Agree to (5)
Strongly Disagree; I identify as a feminist, I believe the feminist move-
ment has gone too far (reverse scored), I support the feminist movement,
I believe the feminist movement is necessary, I support the #MeToo
movement. These were summed to create a Feminism Attitudes scale.
Cronbach's alpha indicated high reliability (α = .91). We purposefully did
not define feminism for participants before they undertook the study, as
we were interested in their existing perceptions of feminism (as they per-
ceived it) and did not wish to influence responses.
News Stories. Participants were presented with 8 news stories in a
random order. All stories were presented as an image followed by 2–3
lines of text.
True Stories. All participants saw the same six true stories; Bill Cosby
convicted of sexual assault, Controversial comments about rape victims
by Irish radio host George Hook, “House of Cards” cancelled after Kevin
Spacey allegations emerge, Controversial comments made by actor Liam
Neeson about the #MeToo movement, Google employee James
Damore fired over an internal memo about discrimination, Donald
Trump comments about a war on men in America. All true stories were
presented with a general image of the subject of the story (e.g., a photo-
graph of Liam Neeson giving an interview).
Fake Stories. All participants saw two fake stories; one concerning
estimates of fabricated rape claims and one concerning a riot that
broke out at a protest. As can be seen in Table 1, two versions of each
story were created – one that aligned with feminist views (e.g., that
there are low levels of fabricated rape claims, that men's rights protes-
tors were in the wrong) and one that did not align with feminist views
(e.g., that there are higher levels of fabricated rape claims, that femi-
nist protestors were in the wrong). All participants saw the feminism-
aligned version of one story and the feminism-misaligned version of
the other story. Both stories were entirely false. There have never
been any studies to estimate rates of fabricated rape claims in Ireland.
There was an “I Believe Her” protest in Dublin, as described in the riot
story, but there was no violence, no injuries and no damage to prop-
erty. Both versions of the riot story were accompanied by the same
image of a man and woman shouting at each other at a protest and
both versions of the rape statistics story were accompanied by the
same image of an Irish courthouse.
For each story, participants were asked if they remembered the
event and could choose from I remember seeing/hearing about this, I
do not remember seeing/hearing this but I remember it happening,
I do not remember this event but I believe it happened, I remember
this event differently, I do not remember this event. As in previous
work (Murphy et al., 2019), participants were classed as remembering
an event if they indicated that they specifically remembered seeing it
or they generally remembered it happening. They were classed as not
remembering an event if they said they remembered the event differ-
ently or not at all. Unless otherwise stated, participants who stated
that they merely believed an event had happened were excluded from
the analysis (as in Murphy et al., 2019). This is to allow an assessment
of false memories for an event, separate from belief in that event,
given that these are distinct processes which do not always mutually
occur (Otgaar et al., 2014; Wade et al., 2018).
After each story, participants were asked “How ultimately good/
bad do you believe this event was for the feminist movement?” and
could answer on a slider from 0 (very bad) to 100 (very good).
After viewing all eight stories, participants were told “Some peo-
ple who completed this survey were shown fabricated news stories
(news stories that didn't happen, they were completely fabricated by
TABLE 1 The fake stories used in Experiment 1
Rape statistics story Riot story
Feminism-Aligned In October 2018, an article in the Irish
Independent caused controversy by
estimating that an average of just 4% of
rape cases brought to the Irish courts are
false.
Following the acquittal of charges against two Ulster Rugby Players
in the Belfast rape trial in March 2018, a large-scale “I Believe
Her” protest on O'Connell Street in Dublin turned violent, with
Men's Rights counter-protesters assaulting a female protester,
leading to a larger altercation causing extensive damage to local
businesses and injuring two Gardaí.
Feminism-Misaligned In October 2018, an article in the Irish
Independent caused controversy by
estimating that an average of 16% of rape
cases brought to the Irish courts are false.
Following the acquittal of charges against two Ulster Rugby Players
in the Belfast rape trial in March 2018, a large-scale “I Believe
Her” protest on O'Connell Street in Dublin turned violent, with
protestors assaulting a passer-by, setting off a riot which caused
extensive damage to local businesses and injured two Gardaí.
Note: All participants saw one version of the rape statistics story and the other version of the riot story. Note that “Gardaí” (mentioned in the riot stories)
is the term for Irish police officers.
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the researchers). If you think any of the stories you saw were fake,
please select them below” and were shown all stories again.
2.1.3 | Procedure
The study was conducted entirely online, using the Qualtrics survey
platform. Participants first completed the demographics and feminism
attitudes questions. Then each participant viewed eight news stories
(six true, two fake) presented in random order. Participants were then
asked to pick out any stories that they believed were fabricated
before they were debriefed. We used a debriefing procedure shown
to be effective in a similar fake news study (Murphy et al., 2020). The
study received ethical approval from the School of Applied Psychol-
ogy Ethics Committee, University College Cork.
2.2 | Results
Over half the sample (53%) falsely claimed to remember at least one
fabricated event; 39% remembered one false event and a further 14%
remembered two false events. Both versions of the riot story were
remembered at a high rate (Feminist Riot = 51%; Men's Rights
Riot = 55%), with lower rates for both versions of the false rape claim
statistics story (Low Rates = 29%; High Rates = 26%). This compares
to a rate of reported memories ranging between 34% and 92% for the
true stories (average = 3.6 true stories recalled, SD = 1.49).
When asked how good each fabricated event was for the feminist
movement, the feminist riot was rated as significantly worse
(M = 36.03, SD = 27.60) than the men's rights riot (M = 52.44,
SD = 28.91), t(1318), = 10.55, p < .001, d = 0.58. The article describ-
ing high rates of false rape claims was also rated as significantly worse
for the feminist movement (M = 34.39, SD = 27.06) than the article
describing lower rates (M = 45.85, SD = 28.80), t(1288), = 11.46,
p < .001, d = 0.41. There was a very small, non-significant correlation
between feminism attitudes and ratings for feminism-aligned stories
(r[1300] = .08, p = .006), with those who reported more negative
attitudes towards feminism rating the stories as less positive. There
was no such correlation for the feminism-misaligned events
(r(1273) = .004, p = .887). We classified participants as seeing a
story as positive for feminists if it was 51 or above on the 1–100 scale
and negative if it was 50 or below.1 Collapsing both feminism-aligned
stories, 55% rated the story as expected (i.e., rated either the men's
rights riot or the low rates of false rape claims as positive). Collapsing
both feminism-misaligned stories, 78% rated the story as expected
(i.e., rated the feminist riot or the higher rates of false rape claims as
negative). We split the file to separately analyse those who inter-
preted the events as expected (the feminism-aligned events posi-
tively/ the feminism-misaligned events negatively), vs. those who
did not.
2.2.1 | Do attitudes towards feminism predict
reported memories for fabricated feminism-related
events?
Responses to the two feminist-aligned stories were collapsed and
binary logistic regressions were conducted to assess the effect of
feminist attitudes on false memories. Analyses were conducted sepa-
rately for those who interpreted the feminism-aligned story as posi-
tive for the feminist movement (n = 438) and those who viewed the
story as negative (n = 594). A further 184 participants declined to rate
the story and so are not included in either analysis. Those who
reported a mere belief in the fabricated event are also excluded here.
For those who interpreted the story as expected, the model was
statistically significant, χ2(1, N = 438) = 16.49, p < .001, R2 (Cox &
Snell) = .04, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .05, and correctly classified 59% of
cases. As shown in Table 2, there was a significant effect of
TABLE 2 Results of four binary logistic regressions for false memories of the feminism-aligned events and separately, for the feminism-
misaligned events from Experiment 1
Predictors b SE b Wald df p
Exp
(b) 95% C.I. (b)
Feminism-Aligned
Stories
Interpreted event as positive for
feminism (n = 438)
Feminism
Attitudes
0.08 0.02 15.68 1 <.001 0.92 [0.89, 0.96]
Constant 0.95 0.25 14.29 1 <.001 2.59 -
Interpreted event as negative for
feminism (n = 594)
Feminism
Attitudes
0.02 0.02 1.60 1 .206 1.02 [0.99, 1.06]
Constant 0.64 0.22 8.35 1 .004 0.52 -
Feminism-Misaligned
Stories
Interpreted event as negative for
feminism (n = 817)
Feminism
Attitudes
0.05 0.02 11.78 1 .001 1.05 [1.02, 1.08]
Constant 1.10 0.19 33.43 1 <.001 0.33 -
Interpreted event as positive for
feminism (n = 233)
Feminism
Attitudes
0.00 0.03 0.02 1 .886 1.00 [0.95, 1.06]
Constant 0.14 0.35 0.15 1 .698 1.14 -
Note: The models for those who interpreted the stories as expected are shown separately to those who did not interpret the stories as expected.
Significant predictors are shown in bold.
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feminism attitudes, such that for every one-point increase (i.e., more
negative attitudes), the odds of reporting a memory for the
feminism-aligned story were 8% lower. For those who did not inter-
pret the story as expected, the model was not statistically signifi-
cant, χ2(1, N = 594) = 1.60, p = .206, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .00, R2
(Nagelkerke) = .00. As shown in Table 2, there was no significant
effect of feminism attitudes on memories for this group.
Identical analyses were conducted on the rate of falsely reported
memories for the feminism-misaligned stories. Analyses were again
conducted separately for those who interpreted the feminism-
misaligned story as negative for the feminist movement (n = 817) and
those who viewed the story as positive (n = 233). A further 199 par-
ticipants declined to rate the story and so are not included in either
analysis. Those who reported a mere belief in the fabricated event
were also excluded.
For those who interpreted the story as expected, the model was
statistically significant, χ2(1, N = 817) = 11.88, p = .001, R2 (Cox &
Snell) = .01, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .02, and correctly classified 62% of
cases. As shown in Table 3, there was a significant effect of feminism
attitudes, such that for every one-point increase (i.e., more negative
attitudes), the odds of falsely reporting a memory for the feminism-
misaligned story were 5% greater. For those who did not interpret the
story as expected, the model was not statistically significant,
χ2(1, N = 233) = 0.02, p = .886, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .00,
R2 (Nagelkerke) = .00. As shown in Table 2, there was no significant
effect of feminism attitudes on memories for this group.
Note that participants who reported a memory of hearing about
the event are classed as “remembering” in the analyses shown in
Table 2 (with mere beliefs excluded). If we used a more liberal classifi-
cation of memory and included those who reported merely believing
the event had occurred, the false memory rate would increase to 70%
overall, with 35% reporting one false memory or belief and 35%
reporting two false memories or beliefs. The regression results do not
change when those who reported a memory or belief are included.
For those who interpreted the story as expected, more negative femi-
nist attitudes predicted significantly greater likelihood of a false mem-
ory or belief for the feminism-misaligned story (OR = 1.04, [95% CI:
1.01–1.07]) and reduced likelihood of a false memory or belief for the
feminism-aligned story (OR = 0.91, [95% CI: 0.88–0.94]). This was
not the case for those who did not interpret the event as expected.
For illustrative purposes, we grouped participants according to
their score on the feminism attitudes scale (minimum 5, maximum 25);
Support Feminism (5–12, n = 917), Neutral (13–17, n = 379), Oppose
Feminism (18–25, n = 216). Figure 1 shows rates of reported memo-
ries for each fabricated event across these groups. Note that only
those who interpreted the event as expected (e.g., positive events as
positive for feminism) are included here, those who did not interpret
the event as expected were excluded.
2.2.2 | Do attitudes towards feminism predict
ability to identify fabricated feminism-related events?
After responding to all the news stories, participants were told they
may have been exposed to fake news and were asked to select any
stories they thought were fabricated. The fabricated stories were
selected as fake by the majority of participants; feminist riot 47%,
men's rights riot 47%, high false rape claims 52%, low false rape claims
58%. The true stories were selected as fake at a lower rate overall;
George Hook 16%, Bill Cosby 4%, Donald Trump 12%, Google 43%,
Liam Neeson 22%, Kevin Spacey 7%. Two binary logistic regressions
were conducted to assess the impact of feminism attitudes on ability
F IGURE 1 Reported memories for each of the four fabricated events (left) and correct identification of each of the four fabricated events as
fake (right) in Experiment 1. Participants are grouped according to their scores on the Feminist Attitudes scale. The feminism-misaligned stories
are shown in a dotted pattern
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to identify the story as fake. As before, these were conducted sepa-
rately for those who interpreted the story as expected and those who
did not.
For the feminism-aligned events, the model for those who inter-
preted the story as expected was statistically significant,
χ2(1, N = 577) = 28.22, p = <.001, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .05,
R2 (Nagelkerke) = .06, and correctly classified 61% of cases. As shown
in Table 3, there was a significant effect of feminism attitudes, such
that for every one-point increase (i.e., more negative attitudes), the
odds of participants identifying the feminism-aligned story as fake were
9% greater. For those who did not interpret the story as expected, the
model was not statistically significant, χ2(1, N = 724) = 0.07, p = .787,
R2 (Cox & Snell) = .00, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .00.
For the feminism-misaligned events, the model for those who
interpreted the story as expected was statistically significant,
χ2(1, N = 998) = 5.54, p = .019, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .01,
R2 (Nagelkerke) = .01, and correctly classified 52% of cases. As shown
in Table 3, there was a significant effect of feminism attitudes, such
that for every one-point increase (i.e., more negative attitudes), the
odds of participants identifying the feminism-misaligned story as fake
were 3% lower. For those who did not interpret the story as expected,
the model was not statistically significant, χ2(1, N = 276) = 1.38,
p = .241, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .01, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .01.
Participants were again grouped according to their score on the
feminism attitudes scale, for illustrative purposes. Figure 1 shows
the rates of correct identification for each fabricated event across these
groups. Note that only those who interpreted the event as expected
(e.g., positive events as positive for feminism) are included here, those
who did not interpret the event as expected were excluded.
3 | EXPERIMENT 2
As expected, we found that attitudes towards feminism predicted
rates of falsely reporting memories for fake news related to feminism.
Individuals with strongly feminist views were more likely to report a
memory or belief for a fabricated event that reflected well on femi-
nism and likewise, those with negative views about feminism were
more likely to report a memory of belief for a fabricated event that
reflected poorly on feminism. However, there were three key limita-
tions in Experiment 1 that limit our ability to draw conclusions. Firstly,
the fake stories were perhaps slightly ambiguous and a significant
minority of participants did not agree with our classification of stories
as reflecting well or poorly on feminism. Secondly, as all of the
stories used pertained to feminism, we could not rule out the possibil-
ity that participants may have differed in their general susceptibility to
false memories and beliefs, rather than feminism-specific false memo-
ries and beliefs. Finally, the explicit focus on feminism may have
biased our participants. Smith et al. (2006) found that framing a survey
as investigating Parkinson's disease resulted in significantly lower
reported life satisfaction for Parkinson's disease patients, compared to
a survey described as assessing the general population. To address
these limitations, we conducted a second experiment in May 2020,
investigating the same hypotheses as Experiment 1. Here, we used
less ambiguous stories, compared rates of reported false memories for
stories about feminists to rates of reported false memories for the
same stories featuring a different group (refugees), and pitched
the study as assessing memories related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants
The study included 802 participants who were recruited via student
email lists and social media posts. Sixteen participants were excluded
after they indicated they had researched on the internet or asked a
friend for help while completing the survey, leaving 786 participants
in the final sample, with a mean age of 33.79 (SD = 12.12). Partici-
pants were mostly (65%) women (n = 512), with n = 264 reporting as
TABLE 3 Results of four binary logistic regressions for ability to correctly identify the feminism-aligned and feminism misaligned events as
fabricated in Experiment 1
Predictors b SE b Wald df p
Exp
(b) 95% C.I. (b)
Feminism-Aligned
Stories
Interpreted event as positive for
feminism (n = 577)
Feminism
Attitudes
0.09 0.02 26.58 1 <.001 1.20 [1.06, 1.14]
Constant 1.31 0.22 34.32 1 <.001 0.27 -
Interpreted event as negative for
feminism (n = 724)
Feminism
Attitudes
0.00 0.02 0.07 1 .787 1.00 [0.97, 1.03]
Constant 0.09 0.20 0.20 1 .655 1.09 -
Feminism-Misaligned
Stories
Interpreted event as negative for
feminism (n = 998)
Feminism
Attitudes
0.03 0.01 5.51 1 .019 0.97 [0.94, 1.00]
Constant 0.50 0.17 9.09 1 .003 1.64 -
Interpreted event as positive for
feminism (n = 276)
Feminism
Attitudes
0.03 0.03 1.35 1 .245 0.97 [0.91, 1.02]
Constant 0.19 0.33 0.33 1 .567 0.83 -
Note: The models for those who interpreted the stories as expected are shown separately to those who did not interpret the stories as expected.
Significant predictors are shown in bold.
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men, n = 3 as other and n = 7 who preferred not to say. Most partici-
pants (91%) were Irish nationals, and the remaining participants were
from another EU country (5%) or outside of the EU (4%). 90% of the
sample said they used social media a few times a day or more, over
the past year. When asked if they identified as a feminist, 50% agreed
or strongly agreed, 22% disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 28% nei-
ther agreed nor disagreed.
3.1.2 | Materials
The survey was presented as a study of “opinions on recent news
events related to the COVID-19 pandemic”.
Feminism Attitudes. Attitudes towards feminism were measured
using the same scale as Experiment 1. However, in Experiment 2 the
items were presented in a randomised matrix alongside other ques-
tions related to political opinions. To ensure the five feminism
questions would not stand out, the filler questions also centered on
specific political themes – there were five questions relating to envi-
ronmentalism, six questions related to racism and xenophobia, and
four questions related to trust in government and government spend-
ing. Examples of filler items are: “I think environmental protection
should take precedence over economic concerns”, “All politicians are
self-serving and cannot be trusted” and “I think the Black Lives Matter
movement has gone too far”. Responses to these filler questions are
available in our online data file. As in Experiment 1, Cronbach's alpha
indicated high reliability for the feminism scale (α = .89).
Filler questions. We also included filler questions designed to mask
the purpose of the study. Participants were asked who they had
trusted to advise them during the COVID-19 crisis, ranking named
political parties, scientists, healthcare workers, celebrities, etc. Partici-
pants were also asked to rate whether they considered themselves to
be at high risk from COVID-19. The responses to all questions are
included in our online data file, but were not analysed further.
News Stories. Participants were presented with 5 news stories in a
random order. All stories were presented as an image followed by 2–3
lines of text.
True Stories. All participants saw the same three true stories. The
stories centered on actions taken by Irish public figures during
the pandemic – inaccurate comments made by the Minister for
Health, a political party cancelling rallies due to a COVID case in the
school of the party leader's children, and an athlete calling for stricter
lockdowns. The images accompanying these stories was a general
photograph of the subject of the story (e.g., the Minister for Health
giving a speech).
Fake Stories. All participants saw two fake stories, as shown in
Table 4. One was a story that depicted a group being fined for misuse
of publicly-raised funds (negative story) and the other depicted a
group assisting vulnerable people during the COVID-19 pandemic
(positive story). Each participant saw both the positive and negative
story, but were randomly assigned to either see the positive story
about feminists and the negative story about refugees, or vice versa.
In this way, we could compare false memory rates for identical stories,
featuring different subjects. The negative story was always presented
with a photograph of an elderly woman receiving a package outside
her home. The positive story was always presented with a photograph
of a mural tribute to front line workers.
After each story, participants were asked about how the events
described reflected on the subject of the story: “How do you think this
story reflects on feminists”? This was answered via a slider from 0 (very
negatively) to 100 (very positively). This was a slight change in wording
from Experiment 1 (where we asked participants to rate how good or
bad the stories were for “the feminist movement”). The revised ques-
tion more specifically assessed whether the stories reflected positively
or negatively on feminists (as opposed to how they contributed to
achieving feminist goals), which is more in line with previous studies of
the ideological congruency effect (Murphy et al., 2019).
3.1.3 | Procedure
The study was conducted entirely online. Participants first completed
the demographics and political attitudes scale before viewing the
news stories, presented in random order. Participants were then
asked to pick out any stories that they believed were fabricated.
Before being debriefed, participants were asked “Did you use the
internet or ask others to help you answer any of the questions in this
survey? Your answer will not affect the rest of the survey but please
answer honestly”. This was not included in Experiment 1 but was
added here to improve data quality, owing to the lack of experimental
TABLE 4 The fake stories used in Experiment 2
Subject: Feminists Subject: Refugees
Positive Story In April, the Irish Feminists Society were praised for running a
scheme to support Irish people “cocooning” at home due to
COVID-19. Members delivered food and medicine to
thousands of vulnerable people.
In April, the Irish Refugee Network were praised for running a
scheme to support Irish people “cocooning” at home due to
COVID-19. Members delivered food and medicine to
thousands of vulnerable people.
Negative Story In May, the Irish Feminist Society were fined for misuse of
publicly-raised funds. The organisation ran a fundraising
campaign for frontline COVID-19 workers, but an
investigation found the money was used for a “wellness
retreat” for members.
In May, the Irish Refugee Network were fined for misuse of
publicly-raised funds. The organisation ran a fundraising
campaign for frontline COVID-19 workers, but an
investigation found the money was used for a “wellness
retreat” for members.
Note: All participants saw one version of the positive story and the other version of the negative story.
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control in online research. The study received ethical approval from
the School of Applied Psychology Ethics Committee, University
College Cork.
3.2 | Results
Approximately one quarter of the sample (24%) falsely claimed to
remember at least one fabricated event; 22% reported a memory for
one event and a further 2% reported a memory for two events. Mem-
ories for both versions of the positive story were reported at a high
rate (Feminists' COVID assistance = 20%; Refugees' COVID assis-
tance = 32%), but memories for both versions of the negative story
were reported at a lower rate (Feminists' misuse of funds = 7%; Refu-
gees' misuse of funds = 5%). This compares to a reported memory
rate of 37%, 37% and 46% for the three true stories, (average = 1.03
true stories recalled, SD = 0.92).
As expected, on a scale of 1–100, with 100 being very positive,
the positive story was rated as reflecting well on the named group,
with very similar average ratings given for the feminists version
(M = 84.09, SD = 18.41) and the refugee version (M = 83.57,
SD = 19.70). Likewise, the negative story was rated as reflecting
poorly on the named group, though more negatively for feminists
(M = 20.47, SD = 19.99) than refuges (M = 32.16, SD = 21.94). Using
the same classification as Experiment 1, where a story was rated as
positive for feminists if it was 51 or above on the 1–100 scale and
negative if it was below 50, just 4.5% of participants rated the nega-
tive story as positive and just 3.1% rated the positive story as negative.
This confirms the Experiment 2 stories were less ambiguous and more
clearly positive or negative than the stories used in Experiment 1.
The feminist attitude scale was significantly correlated with rat-
ings of how the stories reflected on feminists, for both the negative
feminist story (r(288) = .12, p = .039) and the positive feminist
story, (r[367] = .32, p < .001), with those who reported more nega-
tive attitudes towards feminism rating the stories as less positive.
3.2.1 | Do attitudes towards feminism predict
reported memories for fabricated feminism-related
events?
Binary logistic regressions were conducted to assess the effect of
feminist attitudes on rates of falsely reporting a memory for a
fabricated event. As in Experiment 1, those who reported a mere
belief in the fabricated event were excluded from this analysis.
For the positive feminist story concerning a feminist group pro-
viding assistance to vulnerable people during the COVID-19 lock-
down, the model was statistically significant, χ2(1, N = 277) = 4.51,
p = .034, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .02, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .03, and correctly
classified 80% of cases. As shown in Table 5, there was a significant
effect of feminism attitudes, such that for every one-point increase
(i.e., more negative attitudes), the odds of claiming to remember the
positive story were 7% lower.
For the negative feminist story, concerning the misuse of
publicly-raised funds, the model was statistically significant,
χ2(1, N = 325) = 11.26, p = .001, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .03,
R2 (Nagelkerke) = .09, and correctly classified 93% of cases. As shown
in Table 5, there was a significant effect of feminism attitudes, such
that for every one-point increase (i.e., more negative attitudes), the
odds of claiming to remember the negative story were 16% greater.
Crucially, the feminist attitudes scale did not significantly predict
false memories for the same fake stories when the stories described
actions by refugee groups, rather than feminists. We analysed this
using identical binary logistic regressions. For the negative story, the
model was not significant, χ2(1, N = 309) = 0.07, p = .785, R2 (Cox &
Snell) = .00, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .001. For the positive story, the model
was also not significant, χ2(1, N = 262) = 0.62, p = .432, R2 (Cox &
Snell) = .002, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .003.
Note that participants who reported a memory of hearing about
the event are classed as “remembering” in the analyses shown in
Table 5 (with mere beliefs excluded). If we used a more liberal classifi-
cation of memory and included those who reported merely believing
the event had occurred, the reported false memory rate would
increase to 51% overall, with 37% reporting one false memory or
belief and 14% reporting two false memories or beliefs. As in Experi-
ment 1, the regression results do not change when those who
reported a memory or belief are included; more negative feminist atti-
tudes predicted significantly greater likelihood of claiming a false
memory or belief for the negative story (OR = 1.07, [95% CI: 1.01–
1.13]) and reduced likelihood of a false memory or belief for the posi-
tive story (OR = 0.93, [95% CI: 0.88–0.97]).
For illustrative purposes, we grouped participants according to
their score on the feminism attitudes scale (minimum 5, maximum 25);
Support Feminism (5–12, n = 491), Neutral (13–17, n = 234), Oppose
Feminism (18–25, n = 58). Figure 2 shows rates of reported memories
for the fabricated stories across these groups.
TABLE 5 Results of two binary logistic regressions for false memories for the fabricated feminism-related news stories in Experiment 2
Predictors b SE b Wald df p Exp(b) 95% C.I. (b)
Positive Feminist Story Feminism Attitudes 0.08 0.04 4.27 1 .039 0.93 [0.86, 1]
Constant 0.57 0.42 1.89 1 .173 0.57 -
Negative Feminist Story Feminism Attitudes 0.15 0.04 11.36 1 .001 1.16 [1.06, 1.26]
Constant 4.42 0.65 46.56 1 <.001 0.01 -
Note: Significant predictors are shown in bold.
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3.2.2 | Do attitudes towards feminism predict
ability to identify fabricated feminism-related events?
The fabricated stories were selected as fake by the majority of partici-
pants; feminist negative story 74%, refugee negative story 70%, femi-
nist positive story 36%, refugee positive story 29%. The true stories
were selected as fake at a moderately high rate overall; athlete calls for
lockdown 34%, Minister for Health error 43%, political party cancels
rally 25%. For the positive story, feminism attitudes were a significant
predictor of selecting the story as fake, when prompted,
χ2(1, N = 388) = 6.09, p = .014, R2 (Cox & Snell) = .02,
R2 (Nagelkerke) = .02, and correctly classified 65% of cases. As shown
in Table 6, for every one-point increase (i.e., more negative attitudes),
the odds of selecting the story as fake increased by 6%. Likewise, for
the positive story, feminism attitudes were a significant predictor of
selecting the story as fake, χ2(1, N = 381) = 7.24, p = .007, R2 (Cox &
Snell) = .02, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .03, and correctly classified 74% of
cases. As shown in Table 6, for every one-point increase (i.e., more neg-
ative attitudes), the odds of selecting the story as fake decreased
by 6%.
The feminist attitudes scale was not a significant predictor of
identifying the stories as fake when the stories related to refugees
rather than feminists. For the negative story, the logistic regression
model was not significant, χ2(1, N = 388) = 1.18, p = .278, R2 (Cox &
Snell) = .003, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .004. For the positive story, the
model was also not significant, χ2(1, N = 381) = 0.77, p = .380, R2
(Cox & Snell) = .002, R2 (Nagelkerke) = .003.
Participants were again grouped according to their score on the femi-
nism attitudes scale, for illustrative purposes. Figure 2 shows the rates of
correct identification for each fabricated event across these groups.
4 | EXPERIMENT 2 DISCUSSION
We replicated the findings of Experiment 1 in Experiment 2, finding
that attitudes towards feminism predicted rates of reported memories
for feminism-related fabricated events. Strong support for femi-
nism was associated with an increased likelihood of reporting a
memory for a fake story that reflected well on feminism, but
decreased likelihood of reporting a memory for a fake story that
reflected poorly on feminism. Equally, negative feelings towards
feminism was associated with an increased likelihood of reporting
a memory for a fake story that reflected poorly on feminism and a
decreased likelihood of reporting a memory for a fake story that
reflected well on feminism. This is in line with our hypotheses and
prior work which has demonstrated political congruency effects in
false memories and beliefs for US politics (Frenda et al., 2013) and
an abortion referendum (Murphy et al., 2019). Crucially, Experi-
ment 2 demonstrated that attitudes towards feminism did not pre-
dict rates of reported memories for identical fake stories when
they were presented with refugees as the subject instead of femi-
nists. This suggests that the results observed in this study are due
to alignment with existing attitudes, rather than any other aspect
of the narratives used.
F IGURE 2 Rates of reported memories for the positive and negative feminist-related fake stories (left) and correct identification of each of
the four fabricated events as fake (right) in Experiment 2. Participants are grouped according to their scores on the feminist attitudes scale, for
illustrative purposes
TABLE 6 Results of two binary logistic regressions for ability to correctly identify the stories as fabricated in Experiment 2
Predictors b SE b Wald df p Exp(b) 95% C.I.
Positive Feminist Story Feminism Attitudes 0.06 0.03 6.02 1 .014 1.06 [1.01, 1.12]
Constant 1.27 0.30 18.15 1 <.001 0.28 -
Negative Feminist Story Feminism Attitudes .07 0.03 7.22 1 .007 .933 [0.88, 0.98]
Constant 1.80 0.32 31.34 1 <.001 6.10 -
Note: Significant predictors are shown in bold.
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5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
As in many prior studies, the current research presents evidence that
individuals can form false memories and beliefs for fabricated events.
Research has identified a number of factors that may increase suscep-
tibility towards false memories and beliefs in response to
misinformation, including age, cognitive ability, subject knowledge,
and analytical reasoning (Greene & Murphy, 2020; Roediger &
Geraci, 2007; Zhu et al., 2010). The current study contributes to
growing evidence that partisanship may also be a predictor of suscep-
tibility to fabricated political stories (Frenda et al., 2013; Greene
et al., 2021; Murphy et al., 2019). Our findings suggest that the more
supportive one feels towards feminism, the more likely they are to
claim to remember an event that positively reflected on feminism and
the less likely they were to claim to remember an event that nega-
tively reflected on feminism. The findings that positive and negative
political opinions predict susceptibility to false memories and beliefs
for related stories is in keeping with the source monitoring frame-
work. Individuals may be more likely to suffer from source monitoring
failures for attitudinally congruent information (Johnson et al., 1993),
as their prior opinions may scaffold their memory and make it seem
more likely to be true. Research has demonstrated that stories that
are in line with one's beliefs may be supported by schemata or stereo-
types (Kleider, Goldinger, & Knuycky, 2008; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002)
or “borrow” from true memories (Lampinen et al., 2005). Interestingly,
the biasing of source monitoring judgements by political opinions
seems to be sufficiently strong that it is not overcome when stricter
source monitoring is encouraged. In both of our experiments, we
warned participants they may have been exposed to fake news and
asked them to select any fake stories. Previous studies have shown
that fake news warnings reduce belief in fake news only modestly
(Clayton et al., 2019; Pennycook et al., 2020). In the current study,
warnings did not eliminate the observed congruency effects. This ech-
oes the findings of Murphy et al. (2019), suggesting that political ori-
entation biases source judgements in a manner that may be difficult
to overcome with mere warnings.
Though the current study used a simple paradigm for assessing
false memories for political events that has been utilised in similar
studies (Frenda et al., 2013; Greene & Murphy, 2020), we are limited
in our understanding of how rich these recollections were. Future
research might examine this political congruency effect in a manner
that allows for deeper exploration of the phenomenology of these
memories, such as interviews or using a longitudinal design to assess
the memories over time. A further potential limitation is the nature of
our sample, who were over 60% female in both studies. However, we
would note that female and feminist are not synonymous and indeed
the correlation between gender and feminist attitudes in the current
study was weak (Experiment 1: r = .30. Experiment 2: r = .33). As our
hypotheses relate specifically to feminist attitudes rather than sex or
gender, we do not have any reasons to suspect the results would be
different with a more balanced sample.
A practical recommendation for future research in this area is to
consider controlling for how participants interpret the fake political
stories used to implant memories. Interpretation can be difficult to
predict and is itself subject to partisan bias, for instance, voters
express more concern about a scandal perpetrated by the opposing
party than the same scandal committed by their own party
(Claassen & Ensley, 2016). The current findings suggest that political
congruency effects are only evident when participants interpret the
story as expected, thus it may be an important variable to record.
The current study suggests that those with strong opinions on a
given political issue may be especially likely to report false memories
or beliefs for fabricated news events that align with their views. Even
when alerted to the possible presence of fake news, those with stron-
ger opinions were less likely to correctly identify the fabricated
stories. The role of partisan bias should be considered when designing
interventions to reduce susceptibility to misinformation.
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ENDNOTE
1 It could be argued that 50% is a mid-point and does not reflect a
response that is either positive or negative. We therefore reanalyzed our
data, excluding those who gave a rating of 50. This did not significantly
alter our findings, so we report our original analyses here.
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